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This study investigated whether the negative effect of complexity on artificial grammar
learning could be compensated by adding semantics. Participants were exposed to
exemplars from a simple or a complex finite state grammar presented with or without
a semantic reference field. As expected, performance on a grammaticality judgment
test was higher for the simple grammar than for the complex grammar. For the simple
grammar, the results also showed that participants presented with a reference field
and instructed to decode the meaning of each exemplar (decoding condition) did better
than participants who memorized the exemplars without semantic referents (memorize
condition). Contrary to expectations, however, there was no significant difference between
the decoding condition and the memorize condition for the complex grammar. These
findings indicated that the negative effect of complexity remained, despite the addition
of semantics. To clarify how the presence of a reference field influenced the learning
process, its effects on the acquisition of two types of knowledge (first- and second-order
dependencies) and on participants’ awareness of their knowledge were examined.
The results tentatively suggested that the reference field enhanced the learning of
second-order dependencies. In addition, participants in the decoding condition realized
when they had knowledge relevant to making a grammaticality judgment, whereas
participants in the memorize condition demonstrated some knowledge of which they were
unaware. These results are in line with the view that the reference field enhanced structure
learning by making certain dependencies more salient. Moreover, our findings stress the
influence of complexity on artificial grammar learning.
Keywords: artificial grammar learning, implicit learning, complexity, reference field, awareness, higher order
dependencies, finite state grammars
INTRODUCTION
Early theories of implicit learning (Reber, 1976; Hayes and
Broadbent, 1988) proposed that, while simple structures can be
learned explicitly, complex structures can best be learned implic-
itly: by observing exemplars without any intention to learn a
structure and without complete awareness of the acquired knowl-
edge. Implicit learning would be suitable for complex regularities,
because it would involve unselective storage of the frequency of
co-occurrence of all elements present, whereas explicit learning
would be limited by the capacity of working memory (Hayes and
Broadbent, 1988). Reber (1976) provided some support for this
view by demonstrating that participants acquired more knowl-
edge of a finite state grammar by simply memorizing exemplars
without knowing that they had been generated according to rules
than by trying to figure out the underlying rules.
However, Van den Bos and Poletiek (2008) showed that
implicit learning of an artificial grammar, though more effective
than explicit learning, was negatively affected by the complexity of
the grammar. The higher a grammar’s topological entropy (Bollt
and Jones, 2000), a measure reflecting the number of unique
exemplars of any given length that the grammar can generate,
the lower was the participants’ performance on a grammatical-
ity judgment test. In particular for items containing multiple
violations of second order dependencies, in which the next ele-
ment in a sequence can be predicted on the basis of two previous
elements, performance deteriorated with increasing complexity.
This study raised the question of how highly complex structures
can be learned. The present study addressed this question by
exploring the effect of adding semantic reference. Performance on
various types of items and awareness were examined to clarify the
workings of a semantic reference field.
The presence of semantic information has been proposed
to affect the learning (Moeser and Bregman, 1972; Amato
and MacDonald, 2010; Poletiek and Lai, 2012; Poletiek and
Monaghan, unpublished manuscript) and processing (Howard
and Ballas, 1980; Spivey et al., 2002) of complex structures in
natural language. Making exemplars meaningful by adding a ref-
erence field (e.g., visual illustrations of scenes they refer to) has
often been shown to enhance the learning of phrase structure
grammars, which specify the relations between classes of elements
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(Nagata, 1976; Mori and Moeser, 1983; Meier and Bower, 1986;
Valian and Coulson, 1988; Amato and MacDonald, 2010; see
also Van den Bos et al., 2012). Moreover, two such studies have
shown that the presence of a visual reference field can compen-
sate negative effects of complexity of the grammar (Moeser and
Bregman, 1972; Nagata, 1977). Regarding finite state grammars,
which consist of rules pertaining to specific elements rather than
categories, Howard and Ballas (1980) demonstrated an effect of
semantic interpretability of acoustic patterns on structure learn-
ing. However, it remains to be established whether a semantic
reference field can compensate for complexity of a finite state
grammar, when it is learned implicitly (Van den Bos and Poletiek,
2008).
Furthermore, it is unclear how reference fields produce their
beneficial effects on structure learning. Apart from the possibility
that exemplars are easier to process when they are meaning-
ful (Moeser and Bregman, 1972; Amato and MacDonald, 2010),
structure learning may also be facilitated by co-presence of the
dependent elements in both the exemplar and the reference field
(Amato and MacDonald, 2010). Additional correlated cues may
help to constrain the learner’s hypothesis space (Van den Bos
et al., 2012). Finally, some studies using phrase structure gram-
mars proposed that the reference field heightened the salience of
phrases constituting the exemplars (Morgan and Newport, 1981;
Meier and Bower, 1986; Poletiek and Lai, 2012). Adding a ref-
erence field had the same effect as introducing spatial grouping
(Morgan and Newport, 1981) and suffix markers (Meier and
Bower, 1986).
If a reference field enhances the salience of the structural units,
this may have implications for the type of knowledge partici-
pants acquire and their awareness. In particular, when aspects
of the grammar are made salient, they are likely to capture
attention. Attentional processing has been proposed as a neces-
sary requirement for the learning of higher order dependencies,
but not first-order dependencies (Keele et al., 2004; Hayes and
Lim, 2013). Therefore, higher order dependencies may bene-
fit more than first-order dependencies when the reference field
makes both regularities salient. In addition, participants tend to
become aware of their knowledge of salient aspects of the struc-
ture (Van den Bos and Poletiek, 2010). Thus, in as far as effects
of the reference field depend on making aspects of the grammar
salient, one might expect that it also increases awareness of these
aspects.
To our knowledge, only the study by Amato and MacDonald
(2010) addressed the question of whether participants were aware
of the knowledge they acquired in the presence of a reference
field. Participants learned a miniature artificial language describ-
ing monsters acting on objects. Regularities were reflected in the
sentences of the artificial language as well as the accompanying
pictures of monsters. Because certain combinations of monsters,
actions and objects were more frequent than others, the specific
combination of first and second words in the sentences (denoting
the monster and the action) made one of the possible 5th words
(denoting the object) highly probable. Although learning of these
dependencies was demonstrated by reduced reading times, sen-
tence and picture completion tasks showed no awareness of the
dependencies.
However, these findings cannot readily be generalized to AGL.
Dienes and Scott (2005) distinguished between structure knowl-
edge (i.e., knowledge of the structure of training items) and
judgment knowledge (i.e., knowledge that a test item does or
does not have the same structure as the training items). Reading
times are likely to reflect structure knowledge, because partici-
pants are not required to make a comparison between training
items and test items. In contrast, the grammaticality judgment
test used in AGL-experiments involves both structure knowl-
edge and judgment knowledge. Because unconscious structure
knowledge is compatible with both conscious and unconscious
judgment knowledge (Dienes and Scott, 2005), the effect of a ref-
erence field on judgment knowledge cannot be inferred from the
findings of Amato and MacDonald (2010).
The present study addressed two main questions. First we
investigated whether the negative effect of increasing grammar
complexity on learning finite state grammars could be compen-
sated by adding a semantic reference field. The exemplars of two
finite state grammars (one simple and one complex) were made
meaningful by adding visual illustrations; each exemplar referred
to a train with wagons of specific shapes and colors. We expected
that the simple grammar would be learned regardless of the pres-
ence of a reference field, but that performance on the complex
grammar would be enhanced by the reference field. Second, to
explore how a reference field may affect the learning process, we
investigated whether adding a reference field would differentially
affect the acquisition of first- and second-order dependencies and
participants’ awareness of their knowledge. If the reference field
would enhance the acquisition of second-order dependencies in
particular and would be associated with increased awareness, this
would suggest that the reference field works by increasing the
salience of dependencies.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
There were 102 participants in this study (18 male, 84 female;
17–37 years of age, M = 21.13, SD = 3.55). All participants were
undergraduate students of Leiden University, who received either
course credits or money for their participation. The reward
depended on the duration of the experiment. The study was
carried out in full accordance with the ethical principles of the
Declaration of Helsinki and the regulations of the Department of
Psychology.
DESIGN
The experiment consisted of an induction phase and a test
phase. There were three independent variables. Firstly, the task
in the induction phase was varied between participants. Thirty-
six participants were instructed to memorize the exemplars of
an artificial grammar without being presented with a reference
field (memorize). Thirty-six other participants were presented
with a reference field and received instructions to decode the
exemplars and decide whether or not they described one of two
trains (decode). To prepare for their task, these participants first
learned which object feature each letter was associated with. For
the remaining 30 participants there was no induction phase;
they formed the control group. Secondly, the complexity of the
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grammar was varied between participants. One half of the par-
ticipants with each task worked with a simple grammar; the
other half worked with a complex grammar. Finally, different
types of exemplars were presented on the grammaticality judg-
ment test (varied within subjects) to address the learning of first
and second-order dependencies. The dependent variable was the
proportion of correct grammaticality judgments in the test phase.
MATERIALS
The stimuli were exemplars of two of the finite-state grammars
used to vary complexity by Van den Bos and Poletiek (2008). Both
grammars consisted of the same 11 states and used the letters
J, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T, W, X, and Z. Complexity was manipu-
lated by creating different connections between the states (see
Figure 1). Topological entropy (Bollt and Jones, 2000) was 0.71
for the simple and 2.05 for the complex grammar.
A computer program generated a set of 120 unique exemplars
of 5–11 letters for each grammar. Of each set, 60 exemplars were
assigned to the induction phase and 48 to the test phase, so that
the paths of the grammar were represented according to the same
ratio in both phases of the experiment (see Table A1). Five of
the remaining exemplars were used on practice trials in the test
phase; the rest was discarded. In the decoding condition, the same
exemplars were used on the practice trials of the induction phase,
while number strings unrelated to the grammars were used in the
memorize condition. On the experimental trials of the induction
FIGURE 1 | The simple (top) and complex (bottom) finite state
grammars used in the present study.
phase, the exemplars were the same for both tasks. The exemplars
presented in the test phase were the same for all conditions using
each grammar.
In the decoding condition, each letter referred to either a shape
(M= circle, Q= diamond, R= triangle, T= rectangle) or a color
(J = light green, N = yellow, P = dark green, S = purple, W =
red, X= blue, Z= orange). To learn these associations, the letters
were first presented together with pictures of shapes and color
patches. In the subsequent induction phase, each exemplar was
accompanied by two pictures of trains pulling wagons with vari-
ous shapes of various colors. One third of the exemplars referred
to the train in the upper picture, one third referred to the train
in the lower picture and one third referred to a train that was not
presented.
Two rules of reference (of which participants were not
informed) were applied to create the correct train for each exem-
plar. First, if a color was followed by a shape, it applied to that
shape. Second, if a color was followed by another color, it pro-
duced a stripe on the preceding shape. For example, NRXTZ
referred to a train pulling a wagon with a yellow triangle and a
wagon with a blue rectangle with an orange stripe. Incorrect alter-
natives were created by substituting a random color or shape for
one specified by the exemplar. Substitutions were balanced over
the position and frequency of the substituted letter.
As in Van den Bos and Poletiek (2008), four types of exemplars
were used on the grammaticality judgment test: 1 grammatical
and 3 ungrammatical. The ungrammatical exemplars were cre-
ated by switching two adjacent inner letters (excluding the first
and last). Switching letters could result in violations of first-order
dependencies (an illegal sequence of two letters) and violations
of second-order dependencies (a sequence of two letters that is
illegal given the letter preceding it). Switching two inner letters
of a string always affects three transitions, thus producing one
of four theoretically possible combinations of violations: 3 first-
order violations, 2 first- and 1 second-order violations, 1 first- and
2 second-order violations, or 3 second-order violations. Because
switching two letters rarely resulted in 3 second-order violations
with the current grammars, this type of ungrammatical item was
not presented. The three other types were represented equally
among the 24 ungrammatical items. For each grammar, there
were 8 items containing 3 violations of first-order dependencies, 8
items containing 2 first-order and 1 second-order violation and 8
exemplars containing 1 first-order and 2 second-order violations.
The remaining 24 exemplars were unaltered grammatical strings.
PROCEDURE
Participants were tested individually in a dimly lit test booth. They
were seated in front of a computer monitor, on which the stim-
uli were displayed, at a distance of about 50 cm. They reacted by
pressing keys on a keyboard. The procedure for the induction
phase depended on the participants’ task.
Participants in the memorize condition were instructed to
study each exemplar for a memory test. They were presented
with 5 practice trials, after which they were notified that the real
task began. The 60 experimental trials were presented in random
order. Each trial began with a fixation cross in the middle of the
screen. After 1 s the cross was replaced by a grammatical exemplar
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centered at the fixation point. The exemplar was displayed for
5 s. Presentation time was held constant across conditions and
based on pilot sessions with the decoding task. When the exem-
plar had disappeared, participants were prompted to reproduce
it. After pressing the enter-key, participants were again presented
with the original exemplar for 2 s so that they could check their
answer. Finally, the screen turned blank for 1 s before the next trial
began.
The decoding condition started with a vocabulary acquisition
phase. Participants were informed that this was a necessary prepa-
ration for their next task. A screen pairing each letter with its
corresponding color or shape was presented and participants were
instructed to study it until they knew the referent of each let-
ter. After pressing the enter-key, they received a vocabulary test.
The letters were presented in random order together with three
numbered pictures of colors or shapes. Participants had to indi-
cate which picture each letter referred to by pressing 1, 2 or 3 and
received feedback after each trial. This study-test procedure was
repeated three times.
In the subsequent induction phase, participants were informed
that they would see two pictures of trains and one letter string.
They were instructed to press 1 if the string referred to the upper
train, 2 if it referred to the lower train or 3 if it referred to neither.
Participants received no prior information on how the shapes and
colors denoted by each letter had to be combined. Each trial (5
practice and 60 experimental) started with the presentation of
the trial number. After 1 s, an exemplar of the grammar was pre-
sented in the lower half of the screen together with two pictures
of trains presented above each other in the upper half. When
the participant pressed 1, 2 or 3, the two pictures were replaced
by one picture of the correct referent, accompanied by the word
“Correct!” if the answer was right. After 5 s, the feedback screen
was followed by the next trial.
The induction phase was followed by the grammaticality judg-
ment test. Experimental participants were informed that the
previously presented exemplars had been generated according to
a complex set of rules. They were instructed to judge whether or
not new exemplars followed the same rules. Control participants
received a similar instruction, which did not refer to the induction
phase. Participants were instructed to press the “j”-key (for “ja”:
“yes”) if they thought that an exemplar followed the rules or the
“n”-key (for “nee”: “no”) if they thought that it did not follow the
rules. In addition, they were required to indicate their confidence
in each judgment on a scale from 1 (very little) to 5 (very much)
by pressing one of the number keys on the keyboard.
Participants received 5 practice trials followed by 48 experi-
mental trials, presented in random order. Each trial began with
a fixation cross appearing in the middle of the screen. After 1 s
the cross was replaced by an exemplar centered at the fixation
point. When the participant pressed the “j” or “n”-key, the screen
turned blank for 1 s. Subsequently, the confidence scale was pre-
sented until the participant pressed a number from 1 to 5. A final
blank screen separated two consecutive trials by 1 s.
After the test, participants were thanked for their participa-
tion. The duration of the experiment varied from 10min for
the control condition to 30min for the memorize condition and
45min for the decoding condition.
ANALYSES
The data from the grammaticality judgment test were analyzed by
means of a 2× 3× 4 mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with grammar (simple vs. complex) and task in the induction
phase (memorize vs. decode vs. control) as between-subjects vari-
ables and type of exemplar (grammatical vs. 3 first-order viola-
tions vs. 2 first, 1 second-order violation vs. 1 first, 2 second-order
violations) as within-subjects factor.
Confidence ratings were used to assess participants’ awareness
of their knowledge. A study comparing different subjective mea-
sures in the context of artificial grammar learning showed that
confidence ratings captured the largest range of consciousness
(Wierzchon et al., 2012). Specifically, the guessing criterion and
the zero-correlation criterion proposed by Dienes et al. (1995)
were used to assess participants’ awareness of their judgment
knowledge (Dienes and Scott, 2005). When participants perform
above chance while having so little confidence in their judgments
that they claim to be guessing, they possess knowledge of which
they are unaware in the sense that they lack meta-knowledge (i.e.,
unconscious judgment knowledge). The guessing criterion pro-
vides ameaningful distinction, as it has been shown to distinguish
between knowledge that can be retrieved under divided attention
and knowledge that cannot. The proportion of correct grammat-
icality judgments was computed for trials on which participants
had (very) little confidence (ratings 1 and 2). This was used as the
dependent variable in a 2× 3 ANOVA with grammar and task in
the induction phase as between-subjects variables. According to
the zero-correlation criterion, participants are unaware of their
knowledge when confidence ratings are unrelated to judgment
accuracy. Conversely, conscious judgment knowledge is indicated
by higher confidence ratings for accurate judgments than for
inaccurate judgments. Participants’ mean confidence ratings for
incorrect judgments were subtracted from their mean confidence
ratings for correct judgments (Dienes et al., 1995). This difference
score was used in a 2× 3 ANOVA with grammar and task in the
induction phase as between-subjects variables.
RESULTS
The ANOVA on the proportion of correct grammaticality judg-
ments showed a main effect of grammar [F(1, 96) = 12.317,
MSE = 0.045, p = 0.001]: performance was better with the sim-
ple grammar (M = 0.629) than with the complex grammar
(M = 0.555). In addition, there were significant effects of task in
the induction phase [F(2, 96) = 30.864,MSE = 0.045, p < 0.001]
and type of exemplar [Wilks λ = 0.698, F(3, 94) = 13.558, p <
0.001]. The main effects were modified by significant interactions
between grammar and task in the induction phase [F(2, 96) =
3.372, p = 0.038] and between task in the induction phase and
type of exemplar [Wilks λ = 0.657, F(6, 188) = 7.323, p < 0.001],
which will be examined below.
The interaction between grammar and task in the induction
phase is illustrated by Figure 2. For both the simple and the
complex grammar, separate ANOVA’s showed that the propor-
tion of correct grammaticality judgments over all items depended
on the task in the induction phase [simple: F(2, 48) = 32.961,
p < 0.001; complex: F(2, 48) = 16.931, p < 0.001]. The effects
of task in the induction phase were examined using post-hoc
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FIGURE 2 | Mean proportion correct with 95% confidence interval for
each task in the induction phase and grammar.
tests with bonferroni correction. For the simple grammar, the
proportion correct was higher in the experimental conditions
than in the control condition (p < 0.001 for both comparisons)
and higher in the decoding condition than in the memorize
condition (p = 0.009). For the complex grammar, the propor-
tion correct was also higher in the experimental conditions than
in the control condition (Memorize: p = 0.003; Decode: p <
0.001). However, performance in the decoding condition was only
marginally significantly higher than in the memorize condition
(p = 0.057).
The interaction between task in the induction phase and type
of test exemplar was examined by performing separate ANOVA’s
for each type of exemplar. Proportion correct (see Table 1) varied
with the task in the induction phase for grammatical exem-
plars [F(2, 99) = 46.832, p < 0.001], exemplars with 3 first-order
violations [F(2, 99) = 8.648, p < 0.001] and exemplars with 2
first and 1 second-order violation [F(2, 99) = 24.453, p < 0.001].
The effects of task in the induction phase were examined using
post-hoc tests with bonferroni correction. For grammatical exem-
plars, the proportion correct was higher in the experimental
conditions than in the control condition (p < 0.001 for both
comparisons) and higher in the decoding condition than in the
memorize condition (p < 0.001). For exemplars with 3 first-
order violations, the proportion correct was also higher in the
experimental conditions than in the control condition (p = 0.001
for both comparisons), but there was no difference betweenmem-
orize and decoding conditions. For exemplars with 2 first and 1
second-order violation, the proportion correct was again higher
in the experimental conditions than in the control condition
(Memorize: p = 0.002, Decode: p < 0.001) and higher in the
decoding condition than in the memorize condition (p = 0.001).
In contrast, there was no difference between the tasks in the
induction phase for exemplars with 1 first and 2 second-order vio-
lations [F(2, 99) < 1]. Neither memorizing nor decoding enabled
participants to perform better than the control group on this type
of exemplar.
Table 1 | Mean proportion of correct grammaticality judgments with
standard deviations for each type of exemplar and induction task.
Type of exemplar Task
Memorize Decode Control
Grammatical 0.667 (0.119) 0.821 (0.173) 0.487 (0.115)
3 first-order violations 0.680 (0.178) 0.676 (0.220) 0.505 (0.166)
2 first, 1 second-order
violation
0.590 (0.184) 0.759 (0.221) 0.415 (0.189)
1 first, 2 second-order
violations
0.534 (0.195) 0.467 (0.201) 0.503 (0.228)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
AWARENESS
The ANOVA on the proportion of correct low-confidence
responses only showed amain effect of task in the induction phase
[F(2, 81) = 3.417, MSE = 0.044, p = 0.038]. Post-hoc tests with
bonferroni correction showed that the proportion correct in the
memorize condition (M = 0.624, SD = 0.156) was marginally
significantly higher than in the control condition (M = 0.499,
SD = 0.125; p = 0.074), whereas the proportion correct in the
decoding condition (M = 0.507, SD = 0.316) did not differ from
the control condition. Thus, participants in the memorize con-
dition showed some knowledge of the grammar while thinking
they were guessing, indicating that they possessed some knowl-
edge of which they were unaware. The pattern of results did
not change when the number of low-confidence responses was
included as a covariate in the analysis; the covariate was not sig-
nificant [F(1, 80) < 1] and the main effect of task in the induction
phase remained [F(2, 80) = 3.317, p = 0.041].
The ANOVA on the difference score of confidence ratings for
correct and incorrect judgments also showed only a main effect
of task in the induction phase [F(2, 96) = 5.822, MSE = 0.0.93,
p = 0.004]. Post-hoc tests with bonferroni correction indicated
that the difference in confidence between correct and incor-
rect judgments was larger in the decoding condition (M = 0.27,
SD = 0.31) than in the control condition (M = 0.01, SD = 0.26,
p = 0.003), whereas there was no difference between the con-
trol condition and the memorize condition (M = 0.13, SD =
0.33). In sum, compared to the control condition, participants
in the decoding condition showed more conscious judgment
knowledge, but not more unconscious judgment knowledge.
Participants in the memorize condition, in contrast, showed
marginally more unconscious judgment knowledge than con-
trol participants, whereas they did not show more conscious
judgment knowledge.
DISCUSSION
The present study replicated the negative influence of grammar
complexity on implicit learning that was observed by Van den
Bos and Poletiek (2008). Participants who worked with exemplars
from a simple grammar were better at judging the grammaticality
of new exemplars than participants who worked with exemplars
from a complex grammar. The main question in the present
study was whether the negative effect of complexity could be
compensated by adding a reference field. Participants who had
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to decode the meaning of the exemplars performed better on
the grammaticality judgment test than participants who memo-
rized the exemplars, but contrary to expectations, the difference
was only significant for the simple grammar. So, the presence
of the reference field did not compensate the negative effect of
complexity.
The present study also attempted to clarify the workings of
the reference field by exploring its effects on the acquisition of
first- and second-order dependencies and on participants aware-
ness of their knowledge. Supplying a reference field differentially
affected performance on the four types of items presented at
test (grammatical, 3 first-order violations, 2 first and 1 second-
order violations, 1 first and 2 second-order violations), providing
some evidence for the suggestion that the learning of second-
order dependencies in particular would benefit from the pres-
ence of a reference field. While there was no difference between
memorize and decoding conditions on items containing only
first-order violations, decoding led to better performance than
memorizing on items containing 2 first-order and 1 second-order
violations.
However, the finding that performance on items with 1 first
and 2 second-order violations was at chance in all conditions sug-
gests that the learning of second-order dependencies was limited.
Van den Bos and Poletiek (2008) found that performance on this
type of item deteriorated with increasing complexity of the to-
be-learned grammar. The present finding suggests that successful
performance on those items may have been restricted to the very
simplest grammar in that study. The present study did not pro-
vide any indication that second-order dependencies were learned
in the memorize condition. Participants may have achieved above
chance performance using knowledge of first-order dependencies
or other characteristics of the stimuli, such as similarity to indi-
vidual training strings and patterns of letter repetitions (Lotz and
Kinder, 2006).
Regarding the question of whether the presence of a refer-
ence field would affect participants’ awareness of the knowledge
they acquired, judgment knowledge was mainly conscious in
the decoding condition and mainly unconscious in the memo-
rize condition. In the decoding condition, participants seemed
to know whether or not they had relevant knowledge to make
a grammaticality judgment. If they had little confidence in their
judgment, they were not more likely to be correct than control
participants who had not been previously exposed to grammat-
ical exemplars, indicating no unconscious judgment knowledge
(Dienes and Scott, 2005). Moreover, higher confidence ratings
were associated with accurate judgments on the grammatical-
ity test, indicating conscious judgment knowledge (Dienes and
Scott, 2005). Participants in the memorize condition, in con-
trast, acquired some knowledge of which they were unaware. They
did somewhat better than control participants, even when they
had little confidence in their judgments, suggesting unconscious
judgment knowledge (Dienes and Scott, 2005). There was no evi-
dence for conscious judgment knowledge, because the relation
between confidence and accuracy was no stronger in the mem-
orize group (as a whole) than in the control group. However,
judgment knowledgemay have been conscious in some individual
participants.
The finding that participants who were presented with a ref-
erence field were, overall, more aware of the knowledge they
acquired is in line with the view that reference fields enhance
artificial grammar learning bymaking certain aspects of the struc-
ture salient. Identifying a wagon in the reference field always
required combining the meanings of two or three individual let-
ters. Consistently processing the exemplars as concatenations of
two and three letter chunks is likely to enhance the salience of
those chunks and may have led to knowledge of bigrams and
trigrams of which participants are aware.
In summary, the results tentatively suggest that the presence of
a reference field did not affect the learning of first-order depen-
dencies, but enhanced the learning of second-order dependencies.
At the same time, the reference field made participants more
aware of the knowledge they acquired. These findings are in line
with the view that the learning of higher order dependencies
requires attention, while the learning of first-order dependen-
cies may not (Keele et al., 2004; Hayes and Lim, 2013). However,
further research involving measures of attention is needed to
corroborate this account.
In addition, further research might clarify whether the neg-
ative effect of complexity on implicit learning of finite state
grammars can be canceled out by other means. Previous stud-
ies have demonstrated that artificial grammar learning can be
enhanced by optimizing the ordering (Poletiek, 2011) and rep-
resentativeness (Poletiek and Van Schijndel, 2009; Poletiek and
Lai, 2012) of the exemplars presented in the induction phase.
However, some facilitating conditionsmight work for hierarchical
grammars, but not finite state grammars: the model by Poletiek
(2011) explains that staging the input, which enhances the learn-
ing of center-embedded (phrase structure) grammars, does not
affect the learning of non-hierarchical (finite state) grammars.
The present finding that semantics do not fully compensate for
complexity in finite state grammars lines up with this possibility.
Likewise, Poletiek and Lai (2012) argue that semantic biases are
helpful for learning hierarchical center-embedded grammars in
particular.
Studies using reaction time (Remillard, 2008) and reading time
measures (Amato and MacDonald, 2010) have demonstrated
learning of higher order dependencies in probabilistic structures,
which characterize complex finite state grammars. However, the
same studies also showed that participants did not recognize the
dependencies explicitly. This may suggest that the knowledge one
typically acquires of these structures (presumably an unconscious
form of structure knowledge) is not represented in a way suit-
able for making judgments; the representations may not allow the
comparison between training and test items, which according to
Dienes and Scott (2005) is involved in judgment knowledge.
The present study produced three findings. Firstly, it replicated
the finding that implicit artificial grammar learning is hampered
by increasing complexity of the grammar. Secondly, it provided
further evidence that structure learning can be enhanced by pro-
viding a semantic reference field. Participants who decoded the
meaning of exemplars from an artificial grammar acquired more
knowledge (possibly of second-order dependencies) and became
more aware of their knowledge than participants who memo-
rized the exemplars, suggesting that the reference field produced
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 158 | 6
Van den Bos and Poletiek Learning simple and complex grammars
its effect by making certain bigrams and trigrams more salient.
Thirdly, the presence of a reference field did not compensate the
negative effect of complexity of the grammar on performance
on the grammaticality judgment task. Grammars are more easily
learned when they represent meaning directly, but semantics may
fall short for complex grammatical rules that do not represent
meaning in a straightforward way.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://www.frontiersin.org/journal/10.3389/fpsyg.
2015.00158/abstract
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